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I Articles I
The Quicksand of Private Actions
Under the Pennsylvania Unfair
Trade Practices Act: Strict Liability,
Treble Damages, and Six Years to Sue
Charlotte E. Thomas*
I. Introduction
The threat of treble damages and the relative ease of pleading
a private cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act' ("RICO") prompted the federal
judiciary to clamp down on private RICO actions by narrowing the
elements of "pattern"2 and "enterprise,"3 thereby making a cause
of action more difficult to plead and prove. Similarly, the abuses
of federal class action securities cases prompted Congress to enact
* Charlotte E. Thomas is a partner with the law firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-
Cohen in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank Edward F. Mannino for
his comments and suggestions with respect to this article, as well as his general support and
encouragement.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
2. See, e.g., H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Kehr
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1412-13 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1222 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995);
Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 1994)
(suggesting that the RICO enterprise must be distinct from the defendant).
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the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.' The same
cannot be said, however, for the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"),5 the scope
of which extends beyond the RICO fraud requirement to impose
strict liability6 for any deceptive trade practice in Pennsylvania.
The impact of the UTPCPL is compounded by its six- year statute
of limitations,7 the potential for treble damages,8 and the award
of attorneys fees.9 This article addresses pockets of jurisprudence
that may be raised on a motion to dismiss or in preliminary
objections in defense of UTPCPL claims.
II. The History of the Private Action Under the UTPCPL
In response to the consumer protection movement in the
1960s, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") encouraged states
to enact unfair trade practices legislation to supplement enforce-
ment of the FTCA" Uniform State Law commissioners and the
FTC drafted a number of model state laws, including deceptive
trade practices legislation and three versions of unfair trade
practices and consumer protection legislation for consideration by
the individual states enacting unfair trade legislation."
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995). The Act, inter alia, strengthens pleading requirements, imposes a stay of discovery
pending a determination of the sufficiency of the complaint, and authorizes sanctions for
meritless litigation. See id.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-207 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
6. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Foster, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 203, 206 (Ct. of C.P. Allegheny
County 1972) (holding that unfair and deceptive practices are illegal regardless of the intent
or good faith of the seller); Gabriel v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(stating that the UTPCPL supplements common law remedies "with per se liability for a
variety of unfair trade practices"). See also Burke v. Yingling, 666 A.2d 288 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (allowing a sophisticated buyer of audio-video system to rescind contract under section
201-7 without consideration of circumstances of purchase).
7. See Gabriel, 534 A.2d at 488.
8. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 73, § 201-9.2(a).
9. See, e.g., Neff v. G.M. Corp., 163 F.R.D. 478, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Bryant, 111
B.R. 474, 480 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); Hammer v. Nikol, 659 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995). In November 1996, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the UTPCPL to expressly
authorize an award for attorney fees.
10. See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law:
Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 357 (1992).
11. See Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices; The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence,
48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 522 (1980); Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427, 428 (1984)
[hereinafter Consumer Protection].
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The UTPCPL was enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature in
1968. The Act was modeled on the "third version" of the model
unfair trade practices and consumer protection law that contained
an enumerated list of unfair and deceptive trade practices."
Although not as similar to the FTCA as the "first version" of the
model law, 3 the UTPCPL nevertheless is modeled on the
FTCA. 14
As originally enacted, the UTPCPL provided no private right
of action for consumers. In 1976, the Pennsylvania Legislature
amended the UTPCPL to add a private cause of action to "[a]ny
person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for
personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers an
ascertainable loss of money or property .... ,"
An important preliminary matter in the analysis of the
UTPCPL is the difference between the breadth of the enforcement
powers given to the Attorney General and district attorneys and
the scope of a private cause of action. The UTPCPL gives the
Attorney General and district attorneys the power to bring an
action to restrain or enjoin certain enumerated "unfair methods of
competition""' or "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"" when-
ever such proceedings "would be in the public interest."' 8 The
Attorney General and individual district attorneys also may seek
civil penalties for both violations of injunctions 9 and for willful
acts of unfair competition.' By contrast, standing in a private
action under the UTPCPL is limited to "[a]ny person who
purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family
or household purposes and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss of
,,21money or property ....
There is a discrete difference between the scope of the private
cause of action and the Attorney General's enforcement powers.
Nothing in the UTPCPL limits the Attorney General's powers to
12. See Consumer Protection, supra note 10, at 428.
13. See id.
14, See Commonwealth v, Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 817 (Pa. 1974);
Gabriel v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488, 491. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-92 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
16. d. § 201-2(4).
17. Id.
18. d § 201-4.
19. See id. § 201-8(a).
20. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-8(b).
21, Id. at § 201-92(a).
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consumer transactions." Indeed, the preamble to the UTPCPL,
as originally enacted, suggests no limitation for consumer transac-
tions, citing the purpose of the Act as: "[Pirohibiting unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts in the conduct
of any trade or commerce, giving the attorney general and district
attorneys certain powers and duties and providing penalties."23
The private UTPCPL action, on the other hand, was intended
to be limited to consumer transactions that might escape remedy
because they do not affect the public interest and are not subject
to public enforcement.24 When the Pennsylvania Legislature
amended the Act to create a private action, the preamble was
changed suggesting that the purpose of the amendment was to
"[prohibit] additional methods of unfair competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, and [to give] additional powers and
rights to consumers., 25  Thus, while the government is limited in
its enforcement of unfair trade practices by "the public interest,"26
private causes of action are limited to the purchase and sale of
consumer goods or services. 27
III. Pleading a Private Action
Plaintiffs bringing UTPCPL claims should be required to plead
their complaints specifically by identifying the exact subsection
under which they are proceeding. 8 This will focus the nature of
the plaintiff's claims throughout the litigation and may prevent
changes in theory.29
22. See Granite State Ins. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 319-20 & n.3
(3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the UTPCPL combines remedies for unfair business competition
and consumer fraud in the same statute).
23. 1968 Pa. Laws 387. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-I (quoting from Title of
Act).
24. See Neff v. G.M. Corp., 163 F.R.D. 478, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
25. 1976 Pa. Laws 260 (emphasis added).
26. Neff, 363 F.R.D. at 482 (stating that the private action section of the UTPCPL
"provides a private remedy for all violations of section 3 of the UTPCPL that might
otherwise escape remedy because they do not affect the public interest and therefore would
not be subject to enforcement by the Attorney General").
27. See PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2(a).
28. See Lindstrom v. Pennswood Village, 612 A.2d 1048, 1052-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(concluding that plaintiffs failed to specify the facts under which claims pursuant to section
201-1 were brought): Nelson v. Old Guard Mut. Ins. Co., 13 Pa. D. & CAth 173, 177 (Ct, of
C.P. of Fulton County 1990) (noting that plaintiff did not identify particular subsections in
her complaint).
29. See Kaplan v, Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 671 A.2d 716, 721 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996),
appeal denied, 683 A.2d 883 (Pa. 1996) (noting that plaintiffs did not include a claim under
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An additional reason exists for seeking an identification of the
specific subsections of section 201-2(4) under which a plaintiff is
claiming recovery. Perhaps the most frequently used subsection is
the catch-all fraud provision.3" Since the catch-all fraud provision
has been held to be co-extensive with common law fraud,3' some
courts have held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) or
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(b) requires that a claim
under the catch-all fraud provision be pleaded with specificity.3
Ius, a defendant should insist that a plaintiff either confirm or
deny the existence of a catch-all fraud claim. If such a claim is
asserted, a defendant should further demand that the fraud be
pleaded with specificity.
IV. Standing
Standing provides perhaps the best opportunity to defend
claims under the UTPCPL through motion practice. Under section
201-9.2, the person33 initiating the action must be: 1) a purchaser
or lessee; 2) of "goods" or "services;" 3) primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes; and 4) have suffered damages
arising from the purchase or lease of goods or services.
the catch-all fraud provision in the complaint).
30. The catch-all fraud pr ivision had been codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit 73, § 201-
2(4)(xvii). In December 1996 the legislature amended this provision, effective February
1997, to include deceptive prictices. It is now codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-
2(4)(xxi) (West Supp. 1997)
31. See Sewak v. Lockhart, 699 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Prime Meats v.
Yochim, 619 A.2d 769, 774 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 646 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1994);
Hammer v. Nikol, 659 A.2d 617, 619-20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). See also infra notes 85-87
and accompanying text.
32. See Lazorka v. Pennsylvania Hosp., No. CIV.A.96-4858, 1997 WL 158144, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1997); Commonwealth v. National Apartment Leasing Co., 519 A.2d 1050,
1053 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); Nelson, 13 D. & C.4th at 178. See also Dillon v. Ultrasound
Diagnostic Sch., Nos. Civ.A.96-8342, 97-1268, 1997 WL 805216, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18,
1997) (suggesting that all UTPCPL claims should be pleaded with specificity). The effect of
the 1996 amendment, including a new catch-all deceptive claim upon the requirement that
claims under this subsection be pleaded with specificity, remains unclear.
33. Although some defendants have argued that under section 201-9.2, a UTPCPL
plaintiff must be a natural "person," this point has been dismissed by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court. See Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641,
645 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), affd, 605 A.2d 798 (Pa. 1992). See also S. Kane & Son Profit
Sharing Trust v. Marine Midland Bank, No. CIV.A.95-7058, 1996 WL 200603 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 25, 1996) (holding that a trust can sue on behalf of its beneficiaries under the
UTPCPL).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
A. Purchaser or Lessee
Under the express language of the UTPCPL, only a purchaser
or lessee may bring a private action?4 In Valley Forge Towers v.
Ron-Ike Insulators, Inc.,35 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
softened this element by ruling that strict technical privity is not
required to be a purchaser or lessee within the meaning of Section
201-9.2.6 Despite the loosening of privity as a requirement in
Valley Forge Towers, courts continue to require that plaintiffs be
purchasers or lessees.
The rationale for limiting standing to purchasers and lessees is
one of strict statutory construction, That position is set forth by
Judge Wettick of Allegheny County in Lauer v. McKean Corp.37
In Lauer, the court rejected the argument that the UTPCPL was
intended to have a broader sweep that includes any person who
sought to purchase or lease goods or services and was prevented
from doing so because of deceptive trade practices. 8 The court
explained:
[I]t is apparent that section 201-9.2 was drafted for the purpose
of excluding certain classes of consumers who were subjected to
fraudulent or deceptive trade practices from bringing a private
action. If the legislature had intended to permit any consumer
who suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property as a
result of fraudulent or deceptive trade practices to bring a
34. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201.92.
35. 574 A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), aftfd, 605 A.2d 798 (Pa. 1992).
36. See id. at 646-47. The court may have ct osen to liberalize the privity iequirernent
because of the nature of construction contracts. Although the manufacturer sold roofing
materials to a contractor for installation and never directly contracted with the condominium
association, the roof was directly warrantied by the manufacturer to the plaintiff condomin-
ium association. See also Klein v. Boyd, 949 F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that
the lack of privity based upon seller not actually owning stock he sold to plaintiffs was
irrelevant). But see Williams v. National Sch. of Health Tech., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 273, 283
(E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a UTPCPL claim may not
be brought against the subsequent holder of a loan because the holder was not the "seller"
of the loan); Bracciale v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 92-7190, 1994 WL 7707, at *1
(E.D, Pa. Jan. 12, 1994) (holding that since plaintiff was not purchaser of insurance policy,
assignee of plaintiff had no standing to sue); Brownell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Pa. D.
& C.4th 394 (Ct. of C.P. of Allegheny County 1989) (dismissing plaintiffs UTPCPL claim
against insurer's auditor which assessed plaintiff's insurance claim because there was no
privity and no commercial relationship between plaintiff and auditor).
37. 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 394 (Ct. of C.P. of Allegheny County 1989).
38. See id. at 396,
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private action, the act would have been worded in this fashion.
The language that the legislature used is more restrictive. "
The Lauer court further justified its conclusion based on the
premise that "a private action is not the primary remedy for
enforcing" the UTPCPL.40
Similarly, in Katz v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"1 the Third
Circuit held that a passenger injured in an automobile accident,
who claimed that an insurance company improperly concealed the
existence of insurance coverage, had no standing to make a claim
under the UTPCPL.42  After reasoning that the "statute
unambiguously permits only persons who have purchased or leased
goods or services to sue,"43 the court concluded that if the
"Pennsylvania legislature wanted to create a cause of action for
those not involved in a sale or lease, it would have done so."
44
Although the Third Circuit conceded that the Pennsylvania
Superior Court did not require strict privity of contract under
Valley Forge Towers45 it concluded that "there is no indication
that the court would have extended the private cause of action to
a plaintiff lacking any commercial dealings with the defendant.,
46
Moreover, the Third Circuit has cast doubt on whether claims
under the UTPCPL can be assigned to avoid the purchaser/lessee
requirement. 47  In Gemini Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation,
Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.," a health
39. Id.
40. Id. at 397. See also Bonacci v. Save Our Unborn Lives, Inc., 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 259,
262 (Ct. of C.P. of Phila. County 1979) (ruling that there is no private action under the
UTPCPL for persons attempting to enter into a bargain).
41. 972 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1992).
42. See id. at 57.
43. Id, at 55.
44. Id.
45, See Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, 574 A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990).
46. Katz, 972 F.2d at 57. See also Mason v. National Cent. Bank, 19 Pa. D. & C.3d 229,
232-33 (Ct. of C.P. of Chester County 1990) (holding that surrender of financed car to
financing bank is not a purchase sufficient to state a UTPCPL claim). But see In re Smith,
866 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1989) (relating back improper service of process to procuring of
mortgage).
47. See Gemini Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 40 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1994).
48. Id. See also Bracciale v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 92-7190,1994 WL 7707,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1994). But see Fran and John's Doylestown Auto Ctr., Inc. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1023 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that assignment of claims
against insurance company, including a UTPCPL claim, was invalid without consent of the
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care provider who provided health care to persons injured in
automobile accidents sued an insurance company under the
UTPCPL for failure to pay the insureds' bills in full. The
provider's theory was that the injured insureds assigned their rights
under the insurance policies to the health care provider.49
Although stopping short of ruling that claims under the UTPCPL
could not be assigned, the Third Circuit found that a commercial
purchaser of general rights under an insurance contract did not
have standing to sue under the UTPCPL
B. Goods or Services
There had not been much jurisprudence in Pennsylvania
concerning the meaning of "goods" or "services" under section 201-
9.2 until Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries, Ltd.5 In Algrant,
the district court ruled that securities were not "goods" within the
meaning of section 201-9.2.52 The Third Circuit has affirmed the
district court, and embraced its reasoning.
Although not referenced in the district court's opinion, implicit
in its reasoning was the availability of a cause of action under
federal and state securities laws. Indeed, the plaintiff in Algrant
had alleged, in addition to their UTPCPL claim, violations of the
Securities Exchange Act53 and the Pennsylvania Securities Act.54
The court found that the applicable statute of limitations had
expired for all claims except the UTPCPL claim:
The court then held that a security was not a "good" for
purposes of section 201-9.2.56 Although the court in Algrant
acknowledged that there was no definition in the UTPCPL for a
"good" under section 201-9.2, it found that the Pennsylvania
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") defined "consumer good"
using virtually the same language as that employed by the
Pennsylvania Legislature in section 201-9.2."7 Section 201-9.2
insurance company).
49. See Gemini, 40 F.3d at 66.
50. See id.
51. 941 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997).
52. See id. at 499.
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)).
54. See id. at 497-99.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 500.
57. See Algrant, 941 F. Supp. at 500.
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authorizes a private cause of action to a purchaser or lessee of
'goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes . . . ." Article 9 of the UCC defines consumer goods
as goods "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or
household purposes."5 9 The Algrant court relied on the purview
of the FTCA and the approach taken by other states on this issue
and concluded that securities did not fit within the definition of a
"good., 60
The Algrant decision acknowledged the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Commonwealth v. Monumental
Properties, Inc.6 1 that since the UTPCPL was "designed to thwart
fraud in the statutory sense, it is to be construed liberally to effect
its object of preventing unfair or deceptive practices. ,62
Nonetheless, the court reasoned that Monumental Properties
focused on the meaning of "trade and commerce" under section
201-3.63 Section 201-3 was amended after Monumental Properties
to read "trade or commerce as defined by subclauses (i) through
(xvii) of clause (4) of section 2 of this act.",64  Additionally,
Monumental Properties dealt with the power of public enforcement;
it did not involve a private action under section 201-9.2.65
The court in Algrant realized that courts should not write out
of existence the "goods" or "services" requirement of 201-9.2.66
To do so would ignore the express language of the legislature.67
Applying the definition of "goods" under article 2 or "consumer
goods" under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code certainly
makes sense. To apply such a definition, however, likely would
58. PA. STAr. ANN. tit, 73, § 210-9.2 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
59. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9109(1) (West 1984).
60. See Algrant, 941 F. Supp. at 500.
61. 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974).
62, Id. at 817.
63. "Trade and commerce" is defined as "the advertising, offering for sale, sale or
distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed,
and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and includes any trade
or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(3).
64. Id. § 201-2.
65. See Monumental Properties, 329 A.2d at 814.
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exclude all intangible property from the purview of private actions
under the UTPCPL.X
Other courts, without addressing the "goods" or "services"
clause of section 201-9.2, have suggested that the operative issue is
whether the allegedly deceptive acts are performed in the conduct
of "trade or commerce., 69  The definition of "trade or
commerce""° is sufficiently broad to encompass intangibles within
the private action section of the UTPCPL, but this approach leaves
vapid the legislature's choice to adopt the phrase "goods" or
"services" in section 201-9.2.
C Primarily for Personal, Family, or Household Purposes
Section 201-9.2 also limits private causes of action under the
UTPCPL to unfair and deceptive practices for consumer-based
transactions."1 The actual language gives a private cause of action
to purchasers or lessees of goods and services "primarily for
personal, family or household purposes. '"2 This requirement
effectively has precluded business competitors 3 and other non-
consumers74 from bringing private causes of action under the
68. The definition of "goods" under article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not
include tangible property. See, e.g., In re SSE Int'l Corp, 198 B.R. 667 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that intellectual property is not a "good" within the meaning of article 2);
Field v. Golden Triangle Broad., Inc, 305 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1973) (holding that radio
broadcasting license is not a "section 2105 good"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974); Kaplan
v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 671 A.2d 716, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 683 A.2d 883
(Pa. 1996) (finding that transmission in cable television is not transaction in "goods"); Tomb
v. Lavalle, 444 A.2d 666 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding that a liquor license is a general
intangible and, therefore, not within article 2 definition of "goods").
69. See In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 583 (3d Cir. 1989); Gabriel v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488,
492 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
70. See supra note 63.
71. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
72 Id. § 201-9.2.
73, See, e.g., Ralph Kearney & Sons, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 96-3280, 1996 WL
502315, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1996); Media Arts Int'l, Ltd. v. Trillium Health Prods., No.
CIV.A 92-2928, 1992 WL 136081, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 1992); American Standard Life
and Accident Ins. Co. v. U.R.L., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 527, 538 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Waldo v. North
Am. Van Lines, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Klitzner Indus., Inc. v. H.K.
James & Co., 535 F. Supp. 1249, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
74. See, e.g., DiLucido v. Terminix Int'l Inc., 676 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), appeal
deniea, 684 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1996) (holding that owner of rental property cannot bring a
UTPCPL claim); Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist. v. Hall-Kimbrell Envtl. Servs., Inc., 639 A.2d
1199, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that school district cannot maintain cause of action
for asbestos abatement services under the UTPCPL); Trackers Raceway, Inc. v. Comstock
Agency, Inc., 583 A.2d 1193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that insured had no cause of
action under the UTPCPL because the insurance policy was purchased for a business
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UTPCPL. On the other hand, this provision likely is not a
requirement that a plaintiff bringing a private cause of action must
be a consumer in the traditional sense.
In Valley Forge Towers, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
suggested that the focus is neither on the nature of the entity
commencing the litigation nor on the type of product purchased or
leased. 5 Rather, the issue relating to standing is the nature of the
purchase or lease.76  The Valley Forge Towers court concluded
that a condominium association, suing as representative of the unit
owners, did have a claim under the UTPCPL as the improper
installation and manufacturing of the roofing materials used on the
units constituted a household purpose."
Despite the decision in Valley Forge Towers, whose unwritten
rationale may have been to offset the interruption of contractual
privity typical in construction cases, courts continue to and should
enforce the requirement that transactions brought under section
201-9.2 be consumer-based in nature.
purpose); Girton Mtg. Co. v, Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 13 (Ct.
of CP. of Columbia County 1989) (precluding a claim under the UTPCPL for insurance
purchased for business); David Jeffrey Ltd. v. Lucente, 7 Pa. D. & C.4th 558 (Ct. of C.P. of
Montgomery County 1990) (holding that there was no claim under UTPCPL for insurance
purchased for business); Springboro Volunteer Fire Dep't and Relief Ass'n, v. J.C. Moore
Indus. Sales Corp., 50 Pa. D. & C.3d 479 (Ct. of C.P. of Crawford County 1988) (fire
department cannot maintain UTPCPL claim because services performed to fire truck were
not personal, household, or family services); McDermott v. Goodman, No, 1912, 1985 WL
15437, at *4 (Ct. of C.P. of Cumberland County Jan. 3, 1985) (landlord has no UTPCPL
claim for wood burning furnace); Lebovic v. Nigro, No. 96-319, 1996 WL 179982 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 15, 1996) (sale of securities to start and maintain ownership in business was not
actionable under the UTPCPL); Evansburg Water Co. v. Schlumberger Indus., Inc., No. 96-
410, 1996 WL 144427 (ED. Pa. Mar. 28, 1996) (water company alleging sale of defective
water meter reading system could not bring UTPCPL claim); Britamco Underwriters, Inc.
v. C.J.H., 845 F. Supp. 1090, 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1994), affid, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994) (no
UTPCPL law where insurance is purchased for a business purpose); Diversified Contracting
Co. v. Braishfield Assoc., Inc., No. 92-4138, 1992 WL 365514 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1992)
(purchase of workers compensation insurance not actionable under UTPCPL); Mylotte,
David & Fitzpatrick v. Pullman, No. 92-2138j, 1992 WL 229886 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1992)
(attorney's work related to business loans on commercial property not covered by UTPCPL);
Advanta Leasing Corp. v. New England Wholesale Seafood, Inc., No. 88-7741, 1989 WL
60484 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 1989) (equipment lease entered into for business purpose not subject
to UTPCPL). A troublesome opinion is In re Jungkurth, 74 B.R. 323 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987),
which applied the reasoning of a public enforcement decision to conclude that the LJTPCPL
applies to business loans.
75. See Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-.lke Foam Insulators, 574 A.2d 641, 647-48 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
76. See id. at 648,
77. See id. at 649.
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D. Reliance
Section 201-9.2 authorizes a private action for a purchaser or
lessee of consumer goods and services who "thereby suffers any
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a
result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or
practice declared unlawful" under section 201-3." The express
language of the statute succinctly requires a causal nexus between
a plaintiff's damages and the goods or services purchased or leased
as well as a causal link between the unlawful act and the
damages.79 By way of example, a purchaser must show both that
a misrepresentation induced the purchase or lease8" and that the
purchase or lease resulted in damages. Since this requirement is
blended into the language that authorizes the commencement of a
private action, there are standing overtones in addition to the
required proof of a prima facie case. It could be argued that a
plaintiff must be able to allege these two causal links.
Despite the express language of section 201-9.2(a), the Third
Circuit refused to require the dual causal links in In re Smith8t in
which the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that invalid service of process
in the context of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding that resulted
in a default judgment and sheriff's sale violated the UTPCPL."2
Smith is an odd result and certainly a departure from the express
language of the UTPCPL. Perhaps a more appropriate remedy for
the failure to effectuate valid service and follow statutory
foreclosure requirements would be to open, vacate, or strike the
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 73, § 201-9.2 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
79. See id.
80. See Selvaggi v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 815, 819 (ED.
Pa. 1995) (holding that no UTPCPL claim existed because lapse in coverage was not the
cause of denial of insurance benefits); Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Independence Blue Cross, No.
CIV.93-3456, 1994 WL 62016 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1994) (finding that school district must have
purchased medical insurance based on the misrepresentation related to the 75% participation
requirement); DiTeodoro v. J. G. Durand Int'l, 566 F, Supp. 273, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating
plaintiff must be able to prove that she purchased the dishes in reliance on the representa-
tion that the dishes were unbreakable); Mason v. National Cent. Bank, 19 Pa. D. & C,3d 229,
232-33 (Ct. of C.P. of Chester County 1980) (holding that allegation that deceptive act caused
the surrender of an automobile after default in payments is insufficient to state UrPCPL
claim). But see Laxon v. Lenger, 6 Pa, D. & C.4th 175, 177-78 (Ct. of C.P. of Lehigh County
1990) (lessee of mobile home could maintain claim against owner for unfairly withholding
approval of new tenant).
81. 866 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1989).
82. See id. at 578.
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judgment and to set aside the sheriff's sale. Nevertheless, the
Smith court found a violation and held that section 201-9.2 does not
"compel the conclusion that the unfair or deceptive conduct must
have induced the consumer to make such a purchase."83  The
court reasoned that section 201-9.2 "appears to provide a private
remedy for all violations of section 3 which might otherwise escape
remedy because they do not affect the public interest and would
not therefore be subject to enforcement by the Attorney General
,,84
Smith does appear to be at odds with both the language of the
UTPCPL as well as some subsequent Pennsylvania Superior Court
decisions. In Prime Meats, Inc. v. Yochim,"5 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court stated that the elements of a "catch-all fraud
8 6
claim under the UTPCPL were co-extensive with the elements of
common law fraud8" including the element of reliance on the
fraudulent representation. Thus, Prime Meats confirmed that
reliance is a required element of a claim under at least the catch-all
fraud provision.
There was some question, even against the express language
of section 201-9.2 requiring reliance, whether reliance was a
necessary element of some of the other subsections of section 201-
2(4). For example, some of the Lanham Act subsections8 make
actionable conduct causing the likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding. Therefore, it could be argued that, for claims
arising under these subsections, proof of actual reliance or
causation is not required.
This question seems to have been answered by DiLucido v.
Terminix International, Inc.89 In DiLucido, the court suggested
that the elements of common law fraud need not be shown for
claims based on subsections 201-2(4)(ii), (v), or (xvi), as required
under the "catch-all fraud" provision.9" The court in DiLucido,
however, did insist on a causal connection between the unlawful
83. id. at 583.
84. Id.
85. 619 A.2d 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 646 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1994).
86. See supra note 30 (describing the catch-all fraud provision and the recent
amendment thereto).
87. See Prime Meats, 619 A.2d at 774.
88. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(4)(ii), (iii) (West Supp. 1997).
89. 676 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 684 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1996).
90. See id. at 1241.
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practice and the plaintiff's loss under the UTPCPL,91 the second
tier of reliance. Although the court stopped short of stating that
the unlawful act must induce the purchase or lease, which also must
cause the plaintiff's damages, this notion is imbedded in the court's
rationale. Cited as insufficient was one class representative's
testimony that he did not see any specific representation that
defendant's termite removal process was safe but that he so
assumed based on defendant's status as a national company.92
That plaintiff also suggested that the defendant was retained by
virtue of a renewal of the plan in place with the prior owners of the
real property.93 These passages suggest the need for the first tier
of reliance--that the misrepresentation induced the purchase. The
court explained:
[Plaintiff's] primary contention appears to be that [defendant]
failed to say enough in its advertising (i.e., warning or disclaim-
er information), rather than too much. Based on this testimony,
we find that [plaintiff] failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that his alleged loss was a result of specific misrepre-
sentations by [defendant] as required in a private action under
the UTPCPL.94
Accordingly, after DiLucido, it appears that reliance is a necessary
element for private actions brought under the UTPCPL.
V. Class Actions Under the UTPCPL
The UTPCPL is silent with respect to the propriety of class
actions bringing UTPCPL claims. The significance of the silence is
that the 1970 Revised Suggested Uniform Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law,95 which proposed authorizing
private actions and upon which the private action section of the
UTPCPL was modeled, expressly authorizes class actions. The
section in the Uniform Act provides as follows:
Persons entitled to bring an action ... may, if the lawful
method, act or practice has caused similar injury to numerous
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1241.
93. See id.
94. DiLucido, 676 A.2d at 1241.
95. See Council of State Governments, 1970 Suggested State Legislation: Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law-Revision (1972). This revised version of the
legislation suggested in section 8 the authorization for both private actions and class actions.
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other persons similarly situated, bring an action on behalf of
themselves and other similarly injured and situated persons to
recover damages as provided for .... In any action
brought .. the court may in its discretion order, in addition
to damages, injunctive or other equitable relief. 6
Although the omission of this suggested language could mean that
the Pennsylvania Legislature did not intend to authorize class
actions for UTPCPL claims, no court has ever so suggested, and the
existence of decisions allowing class actions counsels against such
a rule.97
The leading superior court decision in this area is Prime Meats,
Inc. v. Yochim,9" in which the trial court denied class certification
under the UTPCPL; the appeal involved the propriety of
certification under the catch-all fraud provision.99 The superior
court first concluded that, under the catch-all fraud provision, "the
elements of common law fraud must be proven." ' ' That proof
includes "a purchase ... made in reliance upon a misrepresentation
or other alleged deceptive practice, resulting in a detriment to the
individual consumer."'' " The court then reasoned that "the
existence and subsequent proof of common law fraud or of
reliance, generally, would require an individual determination as to
each potential class member."" 2
This language in Prime Meats has been interpreted as
precluding class ccrtificatlin in UTPCPL claims brought under the
catch-all frud provision." 3 If, indeed, reliance is required to
bring a private action for any subsection of section 201-2(4), as
section 201-9.2 suggests," individual proof of reliance may
preclude class action treatment of all private actions.
The decision in DiLucido°5 foreshadows this possible rule.
In DiLucido, the plaintiffs raised claims under subsections 201-
96. Id.
97. See Moy v. Schreiber Deed Sec. Co., 535 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Lake v.
First Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (class certified for settlement).
98, 619 A.2d 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 646 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1994).
99. See supra note 30.
100 Prime Meats 619 A.2d at 773.
101. Id. at 774.
102. Id,
103. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 671 A.2d 716, 721 n.4, (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996), appeal denied, 683 A.2d 883 (Pa. 1996).
104. See supra no es 78-88.
105. DiLucido v. "erminex Int'l, Inc., 676 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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2(4)(ii), (v), (vii), (xvi), and (xvii) of the UTPCPL.1 6 The
superior court ruled that although a plaintiff need not prove the
elements of common law fraud, except under Section 201-2(4)(xvii),
for the remaining sections, plaintiffs had "the burden of establishing
a causal connection to or reliance on the alleged misrepresentations
"107 The trial court had ruled that common questions of law
or fact did not predominate because proof would be required that
every member of the class had seen the misrepresentation, relied
on it, and suffered an ascertainable loss."' The trial court also
held that plaintiffs' claims were not typical."9 On appeal,
although discussing the reliance requirements under the UTPCPL,
the superior court held that plaintiffs' claims were not typical
because neither class representative relied on misleading advertising
to hire the defendant termite company."' Thus, the superior
court stopped short of holding that the requirement of proving
reliance precludes class treatment in UTPCPL claims.
A recent legislative development may modify the effect of
Prime Meats. In November of 1996, the Pennsylvania Legislature
amended the catch-all fraud provision to include not only any other
"fraudulent" conduct but any other "deceptive conduct which
creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.'.. It
could be argued, therefore, that the Prime Meats rationale of the
common law elements of fraud, including individual reliance and
precluding class action treatment, may have been legislatively
overruled. On the other hand, since DiLucido requires proof of
reliance as an element of all claims identified in section 201-2(4),
it also could be argued that DiLucido continues to preclude class
action treatment.1 2
The best approach, however, is to weigh the predominance of
common questions of law on a case by case basis. In the context
of most garden-variety, tort-based misrepresentation claims,
individual proof of reliance is critical and likely should preclude
class certification. On the other hand, it is conceivable that
individualized proof of reliance might not be required in some
106. See id. at 1241.
107. Id.
08. See id. at 1239.
109. See id.
110. See Dilucido, 676 A.2d at 1242.
i1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(4)(xxi) (West Supp. 1997).
112. See DiLucido, 676 A.2d at 1237.
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deceptive trade practices cases such as unconscionable contract
claims. In these cases, a class action could be an appropriate
vehicle for resolution of UTPCPL claims.
In all instances, :,)urts should be aware of the particular
problems posed by class actions asserting UTPCPL laws. Not only
do class actions offer the potential for trebling the damages of the
entire class, a court113 could treble the statutory minimum damag-
es of $100"' in lieu of the "actual damages" sustained by each
class member. Thus, by way of example, an arguably non-deceptive
practice that causes actual damages of $5 to each member of a class
action comprised of 2000 participants that should result in a total
award of $10,000 could result in a verdict of $200,000; with trebling,
that figure would become $600,000, not including an additional
award of attorneys fees.
VI. Malfeasance Versus Nonfeasance
A claim for nonfeasance alone, 5 as opposed to affirmative
malfeasance,1 6 is not actionable under the UTPCPL. This legal
principle has been applied most frequently in UTPCPL claims
brought by insureds against insurance companies for the failure to
perform a contractual duty, such as the failure to pay insurance
benefits or the failure to investigate an insurance claim."7
113. The statute directs that it is the court's role to employ its discretion to treble
damages. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2(a).
114. See id.
115. See Gordon v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 548 A.2d 600, 604 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
116. Malfeasance has been defined as "the improper performance of a contractual
obligation." Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir.
1995).
117. See Gordon, 548 A.2d at 604 (failure to pay medical bills); Berro v. Erie Ins. Co.,
20 Pa. D. & C.4th 9 (Ct. of C.P. of Lehigh County 1993); Horowitz, 57 F.3d at 307 (refusal
to pay life insurance policy is not malfeasance required to state UTPCPL claim); Seidman
v Minnesota Mutl. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.96-3191, 1997 WL 597608 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9,
1997) (refusal to pay disability payments is nonfeasance); Thomas v. Masbachusetts Cas. Ins.
Co., No. Civ.A.96-1758, 1997 WL 338842 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 1997) (failure to pay disability
benefits); Leo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 939 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that refusal to evaluate file until obtaining statement under oath, failure to
acknowledge correspondence, failure to adopt investigation standards, refusal to make offer,
failure to effectuate settlement in good faith, and failure to provide explanation for failure
to make settlement qualifies as malfeasance); Smith v. Nationwide Fire Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp
616, 620-21 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that failure to pay benefits and false accusation of
arson is nonfeasance); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Eriksen, 903 F. Supp. 836, 841 (M.D. Pa,
1995) (holding that failure to provide indemnification and defense is non-actionable
nonfeasance); Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F. Supp. 709, 717-18 (M.D. Pa.
1995) (holding that allegations of reckless handling of UIM claim is, at essence, the failure
1997]
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Although most courts take the view that allegations of malfeasance
with respect to the processing of an insurance claim are merely
creative pleadings, some courts suggest that the failure to perform
an insurance investigation properly is malfeasance that can form
the basis of a claim under the UTPCPL."8 Yet, while most
malfeasance claims have arisen in the insurance context, no court
has limited the malfeasance rule to the insurance industry, and
some courts have applied the principle in cases involving other
industries.t t9
Despite the extensive jurisprudence following the malfeasance
rule, there remains some authority that nonfeasance can be
deceptive under the UTPCPL. Some public enforcement actions
have been premised upon the failure to disclose a material fact.t2
Moreover, the UTPCPL expressly states that the failure to comply
with the terms of a written guarantee or warranty is an illegal,
unfair, or deceptive trade practice.12" '
The malfeasance rule makes considerable sense, particularly
where the alleged wrongdoing is premised upon obligations created
by contract.1 2  Except under the most egregious of circumstances,
Pennsylvania law has consistently ruled against the imposition of
to pay benefits which amounts to nonfeasance): MacFarland v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 818 F. Supp. 108, 110 (ED. Pa. 1993); Lombardo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 800 F. Supp. 208, 212 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that refusal to pay benefits is
nonfeasance).
118. See Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. at 620-21 (holding that
failure to conduct proper investigation is malfeasance); Parasco v. Pacific Indem. Co., 870 F.
Supp. 644, 647-48 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that conducting investigation in an unfair manner
could be malfeasance that is actionable tinder the UTPCPL); Brownell v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 757 F. Supp. 526, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that actions to defraud insured of
benefits and misrepresentation that fraud was available is malfeasance).
119. See Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 668
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (rule applied in case brought against public electric utility); In re Milbourne,
108 B.R. 522. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (rule applied in banking case).
120. See Commonwealth v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 551 A.2d 602 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Tolleson, 321 A.2d 664 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974), affd, 340 A.2d 428 (Pa.
1975).
121. See PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(4)(xiv) (West Supp. 1997).
122. Indeed, the definition of malfeasance set forth in Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life
Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 1995), suggests that the very notion of what amounts to
malfeasance is based on the improper performance of a contractual duty. Therefore, it is
arguable that the failure to perform a duty created by statute or court order could indeed
be an unfair or deceptive trade practice even though it constitutes nonfeasance. See In re
Clark, 96 B.R. 569, 580-82 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
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punitive damages in breach of contract cases.' Consequently, it
stands to reason that treble damages should not be allowed under
the UTPCPL in instances in which the law would not otherwise
impose a penalty. 24
VII. Regulated Industry-Per Se Violations
The suggested state unfair trade practices and consumer
protection law contained an exemption from public enforcement
and private actions for highly regulated industries. The
Pennsylvania Legislature elected not to include such an exemption
in the UTPCPL. In spite of this omission, Pennsylvania courts
have developed an area of jurisprudence which effectively creates
an exemption from liability for claims asserting per se liability 2'
based on a regulation or statute subject to exclusive administrative
enforcement. This is a narrow exception, but nonetheless avoids
123. See Baker v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 1357, 1361 (Pa. Super.
Ct 1987), afd, 559 A,2d 914 (Pa. 1989); Daniel Adams Assoc., Inc. v. Rimbach Pub'g, Inc.,
429 A.2d 726, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
124. But see Johnson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 698 A.2d 631, 639 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(ruling that treble damages could be awarded in contract-based UTPCPL claims).
125. "Per se liability" in this context means basing the violation of the UTPCPL upon
an alleged violation of another statute or regulation. A plaintiff may plead and prove a per
se violation as long as the statute or regulation is not subject to administrative enforcement.
See Moy v. Schreiber Deed Sec. Co., 572 A.2d 758, 760 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). Indeed, a
number of Pennsylvania statutes provide that a violation of a given statute constitutes a per
se violation of the UTrPCPL. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2524(c) (West Supp.
1997) (unauthorized practice of law is UTPCPL violation); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6909 (certain
lessor liability is UTPCPL violation); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.609 (West 1996)
(UTPCPL violations for cancellations of timeshare or campground purchase agreements);
66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905 (West 1993) (failure to follow the Telephone Message Act
is UTPCPL violation); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1961 (West 1993) (Lemon Law violation
constitutes UTPCPL violation); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2154 (West 1993) (violation of act
relating to rental and leased vehicles is UTPCPL violation; § 2175 (violation of health club
act is UTPCPL violation); § 2190 (violation of credit services act is UTPCPL violation); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2207(b) (West Supp. 1997) (violation of plain language consumer
contract act is a violation of UTPCPL); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7137 (West 1996)
(tampering with odometers is UTPCPL violation). Other Pennsylvania statutes reference the
UTPCPL as a standard of conduct, See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.15(b) (West Supp.
1997) (deceptive charitable fund solicitation or promotion); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8601
(West 1975 & West Supp. 1997) (anatomical gifts); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 818.10(d) (West
Supp. 1997) (state registration of vehicle manufacturers, dealers, and salespersons). See also
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7311(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (assignment of claims by collection
agency); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6700-601, 6700-607 (West 1993) (authorizing denial,
suspension, revocation, or imposition of conditions of hearing aid registration certificate for
UTPCPL violation and authorizing penalties); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6902 (West Supp.
1997) (cross-referencing definition of "home solicitation").
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the undesirable predicament of a jury finding that an administrative
agency incorrectly determined statutory or regulatory compliance.
As with the malfeasance rule, virtually all of the decisions
involve claims against insurance companies, and involve allegations
of per se violations of the UTPCPL based on violations of
Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance Practices Act ("UIPA"). The
Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Pekular v. Eich,126 ruled that the
UIPA did not preclude common law remedies existing independent
of the UIPA that arose against plaintiff's insurance agent or
carrier. 27 Noting that "Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly held
that violations of other statutes may also be violations" under the
UTPCPL, the court added that the mere fact that the conduct
complained of could also violate the UIPA did not necessarily bar
a claim brought under the UTPCPL' 28 In Pekular, however,
plaintiffs did not plead a per se violation of the UTPCPL based on
violations of the UIPA.1 9 Thus, its significance is limited to its
holding that the mere fact the alleged acts and omissions happen
to violate the UIPA does not preclude liability under the UTPCPL.
Shortly after Pekular, the superior court decided Hardy v.
Pennock Insurance Agency, Inc. 3' In Hardy, the superior court
acknowledged that "[a] cause of action initiated under the [UIPA]
is not an action properly within our jurisdiction." '' Hardy
ultimately followed Pekular in concluding that the UIPA "does not
represent the sole and exclusive source of statutory redress of
alleged unfair or deceptive acts .... ", In Hardy, however, as in
Pekular, the UTPCPL claim was not premised upon a per se
violation of the UIPA. Rather, plaintiffs alleged that specific acts
violated either the UIPA or the UTPCPL. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs' independent UIPA claim.1
3
The superior court then decided Gordon v. Pennsylvania Blue
Shield.t34  In Gordon, the plaintiff had not simply alleged
UTPCPL claims based on conduct that also happened to violate the
126. 513 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 533 A,2d 93 (Pa. 1987).
127. See id. at 430.
128, Id. at 432.
129. See id. at 428.
130. 529 A,2d 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
131. Id. at 478.
132. Id. at 479. See also Wright v. North Am. Life Assurance Co., 539 A.2d 434 (Pa.
Super. Ct 1988).
133. See Hardy, 529 A.2d at 478.
134. 548 A.2d at 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988),
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UIPA. Rather, she alleged that violations of the UIPA amounted
to per se violations of the UTPCPL. The court explained:
In the instant case, appellants [sic] have indirectly claimed a
violation of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act by presenting
the [UIPA] violation as the foundation for appellant's direct
claim, a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law .... Logically, in order to determine whether
appellee violated the [UTPCPL] by violating the [UIPA], it
must first be determined whether appellee, in fact, violated the
[UIPA]. As we have stated, that initial step is not within the
authority of this Court to decide.
135
Thus, Gordon makes clear that a finder of fact lacks the authority
to determine the existence of statutory or regulatory violations for
which enforcement authority lies with an administrative agency
when proffered to prove per se liability under the UTPCPL.
The holding in Gordon was extended in Moy v. Schreiber Deed
Security Co.'36 beyond the UIPA to the Title Insurance Act
("TIA") which, similar to the UIPA, vests exclusive administrative
authority to adjudicate violations in the Insurance
Commissioner 37 Just as in Gordon, plaintiffs in Moy alleged
that the violation of the TIA was the basis for their per se liability
claim under the UTPCPL.138 Although Moy reiterated the
general proposition "that violation of other statutes may also be
violations of the [UTPCPL],"'13 9 it ultimately followed Gordon in
concluding that no UTPCPL claim based on a violation of TIA
would be entertained "prior to the appellant's presenting their
grievance before the [insurance] commissioner.""
Some doubt was cast upon the rationale of Gordon in Romano
v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.'41 Although Romano
did not address per se liability under the UTPCPL, it did suggest
135. Id. at 603.
136. 572 A.2d 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 581 A.2d 573 (Pa. 1990).
137. See id. at 760. Supporting the notion that the Gordon rule applies to statutes other
than the UIPA is Winterberg v. CNA Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 713,724-25 (E.D. Pa. 1994), affd,
72 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 1995) in which the court held that the exclusivity provision of
Pennsylvania's Workers Compensation Act precluded a UTPCPL claim based on the refusal
to pay an injured worker's medical bills. See id.
138. See Moy, 572 A.2d at 760.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 761. See also Fair v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Pa. D. & C.4th 78 (Ct. of
C.P. of L.ancaster County 1992).
141. 646 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
199-7']
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
that, as a matter of statutory construction, the provisions of the
UIPA and its regulations may be used to determine whether an
insurer acted in bad faith for purposes of a statutory bad faith
claim.' The fact that the Romano court specifically referred to
the purpose of statutory construction, and because Romano arose
on a motion for counsel fees, suggests the continuing viability of
Gordon. Romano does not suggest that the jurisdiction be
extended beyond the resolution of statutory ambiguities on a
motion for counsel fees or costs. It did not authorize admission of
evidence of UIPA standards to be given to a jury to determine a
bad faith claim. Indeed, since Romano, a number of decisions have
interpreted its holding as limited to the resolution of statutory
ambiguities.'
The narrow rule has been established that a violation of a
statute or regulation for which authority is vested in an
administrative tribunal to determine violations cannot be used to
establish per se liability' or, indeed, a standard of conduct.'45
That does not mean, however, that conduct which violates a statute
or regulation cannot, independent of the statute or regulation, be
determined to be deceptive under the UTPCPL' 46 The effect of
the admittedly narrow rule could be to limit evidence of regulatory
violations in highly regulated industries such as the financial
institutions, insurance, or securities industries.
VIII. Preemption
Specific federal and state laws can preempt claims brought
under the UTPCPL. Federal preemption occurs when Congress
has included an express preemption clause in a statutory scheme,
142. See id. at 1233.
143. See, e.g., Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 616, 622 (W.D. Pa.
1996); Leo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 908 F. Supp. 254, 256-57 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
Parasco v. Pac. Indem. Co., 870 F. Supp. 644, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
144. See, e.g., Lombardo v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 800 F. Supp. 208, 212 (E.D.
Pa. 1992); Margalies v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 810 F. Supp. 637, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
Fair, 18 Pa. D. & C.4th at 78; McLaughlin v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 504, 514-
15 (Ct. of C.P. of Huntingdon County 1984). But see DeZaiffe v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 42 Pa. D. & C.3d 133, 139 (Ct. of C.P. of Clearfield County 1984).
145. The court in Lombardo ruled that violation of the UIPA could neither be used to
establish per se liability nor a standard of conduct expected of the defendant. See
Lombardo, 800 F. Supp. at 212.
146. See Falbo v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., No. 96-5540, 1997 WL 116988, at *8-9 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 13, 1997); Wood v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-4574, 1996 WL 637832, at *2-3 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 4, 1996).
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Congress has indicated its intent to occupy an entire regulatory
field, or when state law (such as the UTPCPL or claim brought
thereunder) conflicts with federal law. 47  Removal to federal
court under chapter 28, section 1331 of the United States Code
becomes an option for a defendant, but only if there is complete
federal preemption t4 '
A number of federal statutes have been held to preempt
private actions brought under the UTPCPL. Most recently, after
the Supreme Court's decision in Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota),
N.A.,') the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed its prior
decision and held that the National Bank Act and a federal
regulation defining late fees as interest, which permits banks to
charge interest rates allowed by the bank's home state, even if
prohibited by the customer's state, preempted, inter alia, the
UTPCPL."" Moreover, the broad preemption clause in ERISA
has been held to preempt UTPCPL claims for employee disability,
health, and life insurance benefits.1 5' Additionally, the Carmack
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, which occupies the
entire field of liability for common carriers, has been held to
preempt UTPCPL claims.'52 Finally, a state court has found
preemption of UTPCPL claims based on the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.153
147. See Barnett Bank of Marion Co. v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1107-08 (1996); Trojan
Techs.. Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212
(1991).
148. See In re Comcast Cellular Telecomms. Litig., 949 F. Supp. 1193, 1204-05 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Institute of Pa. Hosp. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Del., Inc., No. 96-3041, 1996
WL 729847, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1996).
149. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
150. See Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Mazaika, 680 A.2d 824 (Pa. 1996) (applying the
Smiley decision).
151. See Lazorka v. Pennsylvania Hosp., No. CIV.A.96-4858, 1997 WL 158144 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 1997); Clancy v. Insurance Co. of Am., No. 96-1053, WL 543929 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24,
1996); Schultz v. Thomas & Betts Corp., No. 94-2088, 1994 WL 410826 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4,
1994); Wallace v. H.L. Yoh Co., No. 91-CV-3519, 1992 WL 10448 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 1992);
Ellis Fleisher Produce Co. v. Paul A. Tanker & Assoc.. No. 85-3495, 1986 WL 4334 (E.D.
Pa, Apr. 9, 1986). But see Institute ofPa. Hosp., 1996 WL 729847 (holding that ERISA does
not preempt claims by health care providers).
152. See Faust v, Clark and Reid Co., No. 94-4580, 1994 WL 675132 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23,
1994).
153. See Laarkampt v. Comcast Corp., No. CIV.A.9408-0098, 1997 WL 469323 (Ct. of
C.P. of Phila. County June 1l, 1997).
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IX. Application to Certain Industries
In Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc. t54 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested that "[t]here is no
indication of an intent to exclude a class or classes of transactions
from the ambit of the Consumer Protection Law." '5 It is true
that the only specific statutory exemption under the UTPCPL is for
owners or agents of radio or television stations and owners or
publishers of newspapers.'56  Nevertheless, some courts
interpreting the UTPCPL have taken a common sense approach in
excluding some industries from private actions under the UTPCPL.
In this context, it is important to underscore the distinction
between a private right of action under the UTPCPL and a public
enforcement action. It is equally important to exercise caution in
applying the reasoning of public enforcement actions to private
actions. If only because a private action is limited to goods or
services purchased primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, the purview of the public enforcement action is broader
than that of a private action. Therefore, the UTPCPL does not
necessarily apply to all of "trade or commerce" in private actions,
as it arguably would in public enforcement actions."' Thus, in
restricting the application of the UTPCPL, courts either look to the
standing provisions of section 201-9.2 or merely conclude that the
legislature did not intend such a broad application of the statute.
A. Health Care Professionals
Although not expressly excluded from the UTPCPL,
Pennsylvania courts have held that the UTPCPL does not afford a
private cause of action against doctors, nurses, or hospitals. In
Gatten v. Merzi,t5 8 the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained this
principle in a case alleging misrepresentations relating to a surgical
procedure designed to facilitate weight loss:
[E]ven though the Act does not exclude services performed by
physicians, it is clear that the Act is intended to prohibit
154. 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974).
155. Id. at 815 n,5.
156. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-3 (West Supp. 1997).
157. But see In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 583 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting an expanded view
of the scope of a private cause of action under the UTPCPL).
158. 579 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 596 A.2d 157 (Pa. 1990).
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unlawful practices relating to trade or commerce and of the
type associated with business enterprises. It is equally clear that
the legislature did not intend the Act to apply to physicians
rendering medical services.'59
The court reasoned that to premise the liability of doctors based on
statements about the course of treatment "would have the effect of
making a physician the absolute guarantor of both his treatment
and the anticipated results even in the absence of a specific
contract warranting those results,""6 thereby rendering physicians
"the guarantors of their fault free work."'' The court in Fofly-
gen v. R. Zemel, M.D. (PC.)'62 followed the reasoning of Gatten
to conclude that the UTPCPL is "inapplicable to providers of
medical services"" which, in that case, included doctors, a nurse,
and a hospital.
Both Foflygen and Gatten at first blush seem to clash with the
district court's conclusion in Chalfin v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc. 64
in which th court stated that health care providers are not
excluded from the UTPCPL.165  However, the result in Chalfin
may have been correct, independent of Gatten and Foflygen,
because the alleged unfair or deceptive acts related to a nursing
home's failure to help a patient procure Medicaid payments and
the later discharge of the patient. These acts relate more to
administration than to providing health care (although a discharge
might be more akin to health care) and, for that reason, may not
be at odds with Gatten and Foflygen.
B. Other Professionals
Since Gatten and Foflygen hold that the UTPCPL does not
apply to providers of medical services, it would follow that the
UTPCPL would not apply to other professionals. There are,
however, no decisions suggesting that such a rule exists. For
example, in the case of lawyers, certainly the standing rules of
Section 201-9.2 should curtail some application of the Act. There
should be some level of privity between the client and lawyer that
159. Id. at 976.
160, Id.
161. Id.
162. 615 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 629 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1993).
163. Id. at 1355.
164. 741 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
165. See id. at 1177,
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creates a "buyer-seller" relationship."6  At a minimum, a
UTPCPL claim should be limited to consumer-type legal
representations. 67  On the other hand, a number of cases
asserting UTPCPL claims based upon violations of the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act have been brought against lawyers
without any apparent contractual privity. d
C. Securities
'here was a split in federal authority as to whether the
UTPCPL applies to the sale of securities. The same instinctive
reasoning that was employed in Gatten suggests that courts should
not open the UTPCPL floodgates to securities fraud claims. First,
federal and state securities laws amply cover the regulation of
securities and private actions for securities fraud. Indeed, recent
federal legislation is aimed at curtailing, not expanding, such
private actions. Second, given the Supreme Court's restrictive view
of the statute of limitations for claims brought under section 10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 93 4 ,t69 the six year statute of
limitations accruing upon discovery applicable to the UTPCPL
could create a deluge of private UTPCPL claims that otherwise
would have been styled as securities fraud.
Recent federal decisions support the argument that securities
should not be governed by the UTPCPL. In Algrant v. Evergreen
Valley Nurseries, Ltd.,i7° the court held that a security is not a
"good" under section 201-9.2 of the UTPCPL. t7t In so doing, the
166. See Klein v. Boyd, 949 F. Supp. 280, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that a law firm
that prepared and executed disclosure documents for securities cannot be liable under
UTPCPL because it was not the seller of the securities).
167. See Mylotte, David & Fitzpatrick v. Pullman, No. 92-2138, 1992 WL 229886 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 8, 1992) (holding that legal services related to business loans on commercial
property not actionable under UTPCPL).
168. See Zhang v. Haven-Scott Assoc., Inc., No. 95-2126, 1996 WL 355344 (E.D. Pa. June
21, 1996); Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Teel
v. Panarella, 16 Pa. D. & C.4th 271 (Ct. of C.P. of Phila. County 1993); Martin v. Berke &
Spielfogel, No. CIV.A.95-0005, 1995 WL 214453 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1995). See also PA. STAT.
ANN. tit, 42, § 2524(c) (West 1981) (declaring that the unauthorized practice of law is a
violation of the Ur PCPL).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
170. 941 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997).
17L. The court in Klein v. Opp, 944 F. Supp. 396,398 (E.D. Pa. 1996) reached a similar
conclusion, albeit without reasoning, that the UTPCPL "is inapplicable to purchases of
securities."
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Algrant court distinguished between misrepresentation in the sale
of a security and malfeasance in the servicing of a security. Algrant
also suggested that cases of "churning" and failing to trade might
properly come within the ambit of the UTPCPL as a service.17
The Third Circuit's affirmance of Algrant casts doubt on S
Kane & Son Profit Sharing Trust v. Marine Midland Bank. 73 In
S. Kane the court ruled that securities were covered by the
UTPCPL based upon the "churning" cases that the district court in
Algrant distinguished from the purchase of securities. 74 The
Third Circuit's Algrant decision also calls into question Lebovic v.
Nigro.175  In Lebovic, the court stated that "the UTPCPL can
apply to the purchase of securities" 176 although the court held
that the purchase of stock in a new business venture was not for
personal, family, or household purposes and, therefore, not covered
by the UTPCPL.'77
D. Financial Institutions
Just as there are persuasive policy reasons that the UTPCPL
should not create a private cause of action for fraud and deception
in the sale of securities, policy reasons also suggest that the Act
should not cover the highly regulated banking and financial
institutions industry. The UTPCPL was modeled on the
F-TCA."' Indeed, courts look to interpretations of the FTCA in
interpreting the UTPCPL1 79  Yet, at the time the UTPCPL was
enacted, the FTCA exempted banks from the FTC's enforcement
powers under the FTCA 80 While in 1974, the FTCA was
amended to cover unfair and deceptive acts by banks or savings
institutions, the amendment delegated both rulemaking and
172, See Algrant, 941 F. Supp. at 501 (citing Denison v. Kelly, 759 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Pa.
1991)). See also Advest, Inc. v. Kirschner, No. 926656, 1994 WL 18592, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
21, 1994); McCullough v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 82-2752-58,87-1431-35,1988 WL
23008 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1988).
173. No. 95-7058, 1996 WL 200603 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1996).
174. See id. at *4.
175. No. 96-319, 1996 WL 179982 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1996).
176. Id. at *2.
177. See id. at *3. The court in Klein v. Boyd, 949 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1996), appar-
ently assumed, without expressly making that conclusion, that the UTPCPL applied to the
sale of securities. See id.
178. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, 329 A.2d 812,817 (Pa. 1974); Gabriel
v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987),
179. See Monumental Properties, 329 A.2d at 817.
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1994).
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enforcement authority to the various federal banking supervisory
agencies."'
The FTCA's delegation of authority to federal banking
agencies to create and enforce rules pertaining to unfair or
deceptive practices by banks and thrifts suggests two points: 1) that
Congress intended that rules relating to unfair and deceptive
practices by banks and thrifts be promulgated by a trained federal
administrative agency familiar with the industry and its practices;
and 2) that Congress intended that enforcement be through a
trained supervisory administrative agency that was authorized, inter
alia, to perform examinations of the financial institution and enter
cease and desist orders.
Allowing a private cause of action under the UTPCPL against
banks and thrifts permits the undesired result of a jury finding that
a particular practice of a bank or thrift is unfair or deceptive while
the institution's regulators have found that no unfair or deceptive
practice has taken place. This circumstance is particularly likely if
the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the UTPCPL based on a per
se violation of a banking regulation which, absent the UTPCPL,
would not create a private cause of action. For this very reason,
many states have adopted statutory exemptions for regulated
industries in their unfair trade practices statute,"2
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet
addressed this issue, many trial courts, particularly bankruptcy
courts, have suggested that banks may be subject to UTPCPL
claims.' In most cases, however, the denial of a UTPCPL claim
would not deprive the plaintiffs of their day in court because they
181. See id. § 57a(f).
182. See, e.g., Fleet Bank, N.A. v. Barlas, No. CV-92-0518205s, 1994 WL 324473 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 28, 1994); First Fin. Bank FSB v. Butler, 492 So. 2d 503 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
Hydroflo Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 349 N.W.2d 615 (Neb. 1984); Miller v. United
States Bank of Wash., N.A., 865 P.2d 536 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
t83. See, e.g., Christmas v. Mellon Mortgage Co., No. 96.4779, 1997 WL 197298 (E.D, Pa,
Apr. 18, 1997); In re Fricker, 115 B.R. 809 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Milbourne, 108 B.R.
522 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Stewart, 93 B.R. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Pa, 1988); In re Saler,
84 BR. 45 (Bankr, E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Andrews, 78 B.R. 78 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Jungkurth, 74 B.R. 323 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Culbreth v. Lawrence J. Miller, Inc., 477
A.2d 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (discussing the power of the commonwealth to promulgate
regulations); Safeguard Invest. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 404 A.2d 720 (Pa. Cotmw. Ct.
1979) (allowing public enforcement). But see Epstein v. Goldome, FSB, 49 Pa. D. & C.3d
551 (Ct. of C.P. of Del. County 1987).
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also had statutory claims that created an express private right of
action against financial institutions.184
Perhaps most troubling is In re Smith'85 in which the Third
Circuit held that invalid service of process and the failure to follow
statutory foreclosure procedures that resulted in a default judgment
was a violation of the UTPCPL.'86 The court maneuvered
around the issue of whether the plaintiff, a mortgagee in default,
had purchased a "good" or "service" in reliance on an unfair or
deceptive trade practice, reasoning that a mortgage transaction is
"trade or commerce" under the UTPCPL and that a UTPCPL
claim "is not limited to the initial mortgage agreement only, but
includes transactions and dealings between the parties during the
life of the mortgage."" Fie court basically wrote out of
existence the standing prerequisites of the private action section by
concluding that the section "appears merely to provide a private
remedy for all violations of section 3 which might otherwise escape
remedy because they do not affect the public interest and would
not therefore be subject to enforcement by the Attorney General
under section 4 of the UDA" ' 8  Theoretically, In re Smith
could sanction a private cause of action for damages against anyone
who fails to provide proper service of process.
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania appellate courts have not
confronted the issue of the application of the UTPCPL to the
financial institutions field in private actions, and the issue remains
open. Certainly, the application of the UTPCPL to banks creates
tension between state law and the role of federal and state banking
regulators. Should such a claim be found to exist, it should be
enforced with deference to regulators and regulations which were
never intended to be enforced through private litigation.
E. Actions Against the Government
Although the UTPCPL does not provide an express exemption
for actions against the government, the doctrine of the
commonwealth's sovereign immunity provides the functional
equivalent of such an exemption. Presumably, a private action
184. See Safeguard Invest. Corp., 404 A.2d at 720.
185. 866 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1989).
186. See id. at 584-85.
187. Id. at 582.
188. Id. at 583.
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otherwise could be leveled against a government unit, at least to
the extent that the government unit, in a non-sovereign capacity,
sold or leased consumer goods. Yet, since presumably ferreting out
fraud and misrepresentation by government units was not high on
the agenda of Pennsylvania law makers at the time the UTPCPL
was amended to include a private cause of action, courts may be
understandably reluctant to authorize such actions.
Nevertheless, such a claim was advanced in Smolow v.
Department of Revenue' 89  Smolow involved a claim that the
Department of Revenue misrepresented the effective tax rate on
the sale of new cars subject to manufacturers' rebates by computing
sales tax on such cars without deducting the amount of the rebate.
lhie court held that the Commonwealth was immune from
UTPCPL claims since there was no express waiver of sovereign
immunity for UTPCPL claims.
The nature of sovereign immunity varies depending upon the
type of government unit at issue. For example, for some
governmental uiits, there is sovereign immunity for damages but
not for equitable relief."' Although each type of government
unit should be evaluated to determine the nature of immunity, it
could be predicted that a court addressing this issue would adopt
the common sense approach and conclude that the UTPCPL does
not apply to government units.
F Damages
Section 201-9.2 authorizes a purchaser or lessee "to recover
actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is
greater.""' The issue remains, however, exactly what constitutes
"actual damages" under that section."92
189. 547 A.2d 478 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), affd, 557 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1989). See also Teel
v. Panarella, 16 Pa. D.& C.4th 271 (Ct. of C.P, of Phila. County 1993) (suggesting that
UTPCPL does not apply to municipality's efforts to collect taxes); Ruman v. Department of
Revenue, 462 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D, Pa. 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 964 (1980) (ruling that the UTPCPL does not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction).
190. See E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Larson, 498 A.2d 1364, 1369 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985), aff d,
503 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1986) (suggesting that local agencies have limited sovereign immunity for
damages, but not for injunctive relief).
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2(a) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
192. See Gray v. Green Lincoln Mercury Mazda, Inc., 16 Phila. 411 (1987) (suggesting
that "actual loss" and not benefit of bargain was "actual damages" in UTPCPI. claim).
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Although early decisions held that actual damages included the
remedy of "reimbursement for [tte] original outlay" or the
purchase price," actual damages have not been limited to
rescission. In Young v. Dart,94 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
sanctioned a jury award of damages that included incidental and
consequential damages in addition to return of the purchase price
less depreciation from use. 9 Some bankruptcy court decisions
have held that emotional distress is not included in the definition
of "actual damages" in section 201-9.2.96
Section 201-9.2 also authorizes a court to treble the award of
actual damages.97 Trebling is a matter for the discretion of the
court;19 yet, the UTPCPL gives courts no standards by which to
determine whether trebling of an award is appropriate. In earlier
decisions, courts considered the trebling of actual damages similar
to punitive damages, requiring evidence of outrageous or
unconscionable conduct. 99  Recently, however, in Johnson v.
Hyundai Motor Amnerica,") the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
while concurring that trebling damages was a form of punitive
damages, concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in
trebling damages based upon "reckless" conduct. It found that a
finding of outrageous or unconscionable conduct was not a
prerequisite to trebling damages.2"'
Courts addressing the entitlement of a successful UTPCPL
claimant to attorneys fees have cited the language in section 201-9.2
authorizing "such additional relief as necessary or proper.i
20 2
However, the 1996 amendment to the UTFPCPL added an express
authorization for attorneys' fees making official what courts had
193. DiTeodoro v. J. G. Durand Int'l, 566 F. Supp. 273, 275 (ED. Pa, 1983).
194. 630 A.2d 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). See also In re Milbourne, 108 B.R. 522, 544
(Bankr, E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Jungkurth, 74 B.R, 323, 336 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
195. See Young, 630 A.2d at 26.
196. See In re Bryant, 111 B.R. 474, 479-80 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Russell, 72 B.R.
855, 863 (Bankr. E D. Pa. 1987); in re Clark, 96 B.R. 569, 583 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
197. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2(a) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
198. See Hammer v. Nikol, 659 A.2d 617,620 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); Gambrill v. Alfa
Romeo, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 877 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1989).
199. See McClelland v. Hyundai Motor Am., 851 F. Supp. 680,681 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing
Smith v. Chrysler Credit Corp., No. 89-2898, 1990 WL 65700 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1990)). See
also In re Bryant, 111 B.R. 474 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
200. 698 A.2d 631, 638-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
201. See id.
202. Hammer, 659 A.2d at 620; Neff v. G.M. Corp., 163 F.R.D. 478, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
In re Bryant, I11 B.R. at 480.
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consistently found in their analyses. An award of attorneys' fees,
however, remains a matter of discretion for the trial court, and a




The lack of definition in the UTPCPL, together with the
jurisprudence encouraging a broad reading of the Act, have opened
the door to a broad range of consumer claims. The combination
of class action treatment, treble damages, and award of attorneys'
fees provides lucratix e incentives for the commencement of
UTPCPL actions. While Congress and the federal judiciary are
tightening the restrictions on RICO and federal securities claims,
Pennsylvania courts continue to interpret the UTPCPL liberally.
If Pennsylvania courts continue to employ a liberal construction to
UTPCPL claims, they must be cautious not to interpret away the
legislature's written word or to open the floodgates to state
litigation when the trough has run dry in federal courts.
203. Sewak v. Lockhart, 699 A.2d 755, 762 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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